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ABSTRACT 
Coordination deficiencies have been identified after the March 2011 earthquakes in Japan in terms of scheduling 
and allocation of resources, with time pressure, resource shortages, and especially informational uncertainty 
being main challenges. We suggest a decision support model that accounts for these challenges by drawing on 
fuzzy set theory and fuzzy optimization. Based on requirements from practice and the findings of our literature 
review, the decision model considers the following premises: incidents and rescue units are spatially distributed, 
rescue units possess specific capabilities, processing is non-preemptive, and informational uncertainty through 
linguistic assessments is predominant when on-site units vaguely report about incidents and their attributes, or 
system reports are not exact. We also suggest a Monte Carlo-based heuristic solution procedure and conduct a 
computational evaluation of different scenarios. We benchmark the results of our heuristic with results yielded 
through applying a greedy approach. The results indicate that using our Monte Carlo simulation to solve the 
decision support model inspired by fuzzy set theory can substantially reduce the overall harm. 
Keywords 
Decision Support Systems, (Fuzzy) Optimization, Coordination, Informational Uncertainty, Fuzzy Set Theory. 
INTRODUCTION 
Natural disasters, including earthquakes, tsunamis, floods, hurricanes, and volcanic eruptions, have caused 
tremendous harm and continue to threaten millions of humans and various infrastructure capabilities each year. 
Being consistent with the terminology of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 
(IFRC) and the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), we use the term “disaster” in the 
following sense (IFRC): “A disaster is a sudden, calamitous event that seriously disrupts the functioning of a 
community or society and causes human, material, and economic or environmental losses that exceed the 
community’s or society’s ability to cope using its own resources.” In this study, we focus on disasters based on 
natural disasters, not on technological, man-made, or attack-based disasters. In contrast to the latter types, their 
natural counterparts are not preventable. Thus, the actions that need to be taken before, during, and after 
disasters and the used data are different. For example, risk management of floods and hurricanes can draw on 
geological data, while the risk management of nuclear attacks by terrorists cannot do so.  
The coordination of resources during natural disasters is characterized by a high level of informational 
uncertainty due to the chaotic situation, severe resource shortages, and a high demand for timely information in 
the presence of the disruption of infrastructure support (Chen, Sharman, Rao, and Upadhyaya, 2008). The 
March 2011 earthquakes near the coast of Sendai, Japan manifested these presumptions, as did the management 
of the succeeding nuclear disaster (Krolicki, 2011). Emergency operations centers (EOC) were confronted to the 
partial breakdown of information systems and uncertain access infrastructures to incidents (roadblocks). 
Officials had to deal with numerous incidents where more than 27,000 people were found dead or missing and 
some 150,000 Japanese displaced (Sanders, 2011). An improvisation and decentralization of the actions of local 
commanders and rescue teams have been noticed. The involvement of numerous, international organizations 
with different disaster response policies, resources, and technological infrastructures and capabilities led to 
distributed planning and implementing of response actions (Chawla, 2011). Poor communication between 
geographically dispersed EOCs, a lack of accurate data, and an immense time pressure intensified the dilemma 
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(Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 2011; Dmitracova, 2010). Even though resource scarcity can occur, we argue that the 
“appropriate allocation of [spatially distributed] resources is more important (…) [and] a problem of 
coordination” (Comfort, Ko, and Zagorecki, 2004; Klingner, 2011). 
The above issues reveal that the automation of allocating rescue units to incidents remains a challenge in 
utilizing Emergency Response Systems (ERS). In practice, as told by associates of the German Federal Agency 
of Technical Relief (THW), assignments and schedules for resources are still derived through the application of 
greedy policies: for example, based on a ranking of incidents in terms of destructiveness, the most severe 
incidents are sequentially handled by the closest, idle rescue units, (also stated by Comfort, 1999). However, this 
rather straightforward – albeit in many cases common and favorable – rule ignores estimated processing times 
of incidents, which are often not exact but may significantly affect casualties of less severe incidents and 
thereby the resulting harm. 
When EOCs face the challenge to coordinate their rescue units, they usually find a chaotic situation in which 
much information is uncertain. For example, the severity of incidents is described in terms of linguistic terms, 
such as “lots of damage” or “a little fire burning”. Subsequently, information on how much time rescue units 
need to process these incidents is vague, too. The chaotic situation does also not allow making precise 
statements on how long rescue units travel between two points of incidents as the traffic infrastructure may be 
severely affected. All these types of information have in common that the impreciseness of predictions is due to 
a lack of information, belief, and linguistic characterizations, which all are deemed some of the most important 
roots of uncertainty (Zimmermann, 2000). In the absence of statistical information and in the presence of 
subjective uncertainty we account for these roots of uncertainty by drawing on fuzzy set theory (Zadeh, 1965) 
among the many available uncertainty theories. Fuzzy set theory in emergency response situations has been 
stated appropriate (Altay and Green III, 2006). This fact is based on the idea that “a [fuzzy set theory based] 
framework provides a natural way of dealing with problems in which the source of imprecision is the absence of 
sharply defined criteria of class membership rather than the presence of random variables.” (Zadeh, 1965) 
We also argue that time is the most crucial factor during emergency response coordination and argue for the 
primary goal to minimize completion times of incidents, where completion times can be defined as the duration 
of the occurrence of an incident until its extinction. As the literature provides only few papers on decision 
support in emergency response situations that deal with the assignment of the rescue units to incidents by using 
optimization modeling (see next section), the purpose of our paper is to suggest a novel mathematical decision 
model, and to propose and to evaluate a solution heuristic (a Monte Carlo simulation). 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: based on a review from scholars and interviews with 
practitioners, we identify requirements for a decision support model in the subsequent section. Thirdly, we 
present our artifact, a quantitative decision model incorporating findings from Fuzzy (Set) Theory. Then we 
describe the computational evaluation, which attests the advantages of the suggested solution approach over a 
procedure which is found in practice. The paper closes with a conclusion. 
REQUIREMENT ENGINEERING 
Our requirement engineering section considers two sources: first, in order to account for the experience of 
practitioners, we interviewed associates of the German Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW), who were 
in direct contact with the first German search and rescue teams after the major earthquakes in Japan in March 
2011 and who were knowledgeable with respect to on-site coordination. Second, we use knowledge and 
experience of scholars with domain expertise (literature review).  
The issue of allocating and scheduling rescue units during emergency response has been addressed only rarely 
in the literature. (Fiedrich, Gehbauer, and Rickers, 2000), (Rolland, Patterson, Ward, and Dodin, 2010), and 
(Wex, Schryen, and Neumann, 2011) all attest that rescue units’ assignments and schedules are an understudied, 
yet highly relevant topic for IS research, and they suggest applying decision optimization models in a 
centralized manner, with a particular focus on the allocation of distributed rescue units to incidents. However, 
(Rolland et al., 2010) neglect the fact that rescue units are diverse in their skills. (Fiedrich et al., 2000) consider 
only one type of incident: earthquakes. (Wex et al., 2011) take heterogeneous rescue units into account for 
coordination in a centralized way and they do not concentrate on one distinct disaster type only. Yet, what all 
three aforementioned works lack is that they propose no possibilities to handle informational uncertainty, i.e. 
due to linguistic assessments, even though all authors identify this issue as one crucial challenge. In the 
autonomous agents community, several works have been proposed that handle task allocation in uncertain 
environments mainly by using auctions that either do not explicitly coordinate rescue agents or that do not fully 
consider the characteristics of the emergency response domain (Nair, Ito, Tambe, and Marsella, 2002; 
Ramchurn, Rogers, Macarthur, Farinelli, Vytelingum, Vetsikas and Jennings, 2008). 
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The first 72 hours after any catastrophe, the so-called critical deadline, are essential for surviving (Engelmann 
and Fiedrich, 2007; Reijers, Jansen-Vullers, Zur Muehlen, and Appl, 2007). Therefore, any research presenting 
quantitative artifacts must demonstrate its ability to (re-)act timely in real-world applications. As a consequence, 
any decision support system has to provide allocation and scheduling suggestions that are not only practically 
feasible and justifiable (in terms of specific criteria to be defined) but that are also made speedily available to 
aid organizations. Thus, we define Requirement 1: 
Timeliness of decision support 
A lack of centralized coordination may yield deficiencies in terms of control over actions of units and error-
prone supervision caused by inhomogeneous or duplicate commands to multi-autonomous agents with limited 
information about other actors’ status and positions (Airy, Mullen, and Yen, 2009). When international aid 
organizations come and work together during a disaster, they consequently “put themselves under the control of 
the responsible EOC without losing their internal, autarkic command structure” (cit. THW, translated). 
Following the argument of (Rolland et al., 2010), that congruent activities and non-interference among multiple 
decision-makers are ensured by separating operational areas, we further argue that by installing a decision 
support system for single, closed operational areas or jurisdictions, computer assistance is more consistent, 
penetrative and thus more effective. This is particularly important for situations when single organizations “are 
assigned their own operational area, which is then to be operated independently such that the organization acts 
as an EOC” (cit. THW, translated). Since key planning tasks in disaster management also include the 
assignment of distributed rescue units to incidents and their scheduling, it is essential to consider information on 
capabilities, processing times, and travel times of rescue units as well as information on incident locations and 
types, albeit information may be uncertain and not crisp (Fiedrich et al., 2000). We need to assume that 
commanders do have such (complete) information on their own resources and (at least uncertain) information on 
incidents to process. This argument is reasonable when (geographic) information systems are optimally installed 
and interconnected, suitable protocol standards exist as well as communication between commanders and on-
site agents is distinct and stable. To sum up, any decision support system for resource assignments and 
scheduling needs to have such complete albeit uncertain information on resources and incidents available, and 
the commander in charge that applies the decision support system can decide and act autonomously. 
Requirement 2 identifies: 
Completeness of (decentralized) information and decision autonomy of decentralized commanders 
“When several, differently-skilled rescue teams collaborate, it is often hard to strictly classify their structure, 
capabilities, and their behavior. In fact, rescue units are diverse in their capabilities and sizes. (…) Generally, 
incidents are classified into types, such that distinct specialized rescue units are required, although it is more 
than challenging to prioritize a scene and to tell when search-and-rescue or firefighting brigades need to be 
demanded.” (cit. THW, translated) Accounting for this insight of practitioners, we argue that decision support 
systems need to consider heterogeneous types of incidents and distinct capabilities of rescue units. For example, 
units can be paramedics, fire brigades, or policemen. In cases where no detailed information is available, it 
seems straightforward to classify incidents coarse-grained and to assign one of the rescue units that is deemed 
most appropriate for addressing the incident. In other cases, more detailed information on incidents is available 
and can be matched with specific capabilities of rescue units. Requirement 3 reads: 
Consideration of differently skilled rescue units and heterogeneous incidents 
As mentioned above, during any natural disaster much information remains uncertain: “decision support 
systems used in disaster management must cope with the complexity and uncertainty involved with the 
scheduling assignment of differentially-skilled personnel and assets to specific tasks” (Rolland et al., 2010). 
Thus, commanders often face uncertain, unconfirmed, and even contradictory information (Comes, Conrado, 
Hiete, Kamermans, Pavlin, and Wijngaards, 2010). This also includes statements on the severity levels of 
incidents. As characteristics of incidents are often described and assessed by humans, linguistic estimations are 
common. Other issues of (linguistic) uncertainty include non-accurate approximations about processing times, 
distances between incidents and positions of rescue units. Thus, we argue that decision support systems need to 
account for linguistic, non-probabilistic informational uncertainty, Requirement 4: 
Consideration of linguistic informational uncertainty 
We recall that uncertainty in chaotic emergency situations occurs due to incomplete and imprecisely stated 
information and not due to statistical uncertainty. Consequently, we do not suggest a probabilistic optimization 
model but a decision model that draws on fuzzy set theory, fuzzy arithmetic, and fuzzy optimization. The 
following description of the decision model briefly introduces into the key concepts; for a comprehensive 
overview of these areas, see (Buckley and Eslami, 2002; Klir and Yuan, 1995).  
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A FUZZY DECISION MODEL 
Fuzzy Set Theory 
Fuzzy set theory generalizes traditional set theory by providing for a degree of membership that indicates if an 
element belongs to a fuzzy set, in contrast to (crisp) set theory, wherein an element explicitly either comes with 
a set or not. A specific type of a fuzzy set is a fuzzy number (Buckley and Eslami, 2002), which is formally 
defined by , | ∈ , :  → 0,1, where  is referred to as fuzzy number.  is denoted as the 
membership function of , and it outputs the degree with which  ∈  belongs to . For example, the fuzzy 
number 10  which is to be equivalently seen as “real numbers close to ten” may be given by the membership 
function   1    10 (x∈ ), 10  1. Note that the membership function differs 
from a probability density function in two regards:    does not need to equal 1, and it mirrors the 
subjective attitude of an individual rather than reflecting statistical evidence. This is advantageous in cases 
where probabilities or exact data is not available, but subjective estimates of experienced experts are given. In 
the emergency response setting such cases are typically prevalent. The Fuzzy Decision Model makes use of the 
concept of symmetric triangular fuzzy numbers. A triangular fuzzy number N=(a,b,c) , a<b<c, {a,b,c}∈R, is a 
fuzzy set over R, with the membership function    
!"#" , $%	' (  ) *+!+# , $%	* (  ( ,0, -./012$30  
If l:=(c-b)=(b-a), the triangular fuzzy number is symmetric. We use symmetric fuzzy numbers with l=0.1*b 
depending on the degree of uncertainty we are facing. This corresponds to "10% fuzziness". While for many 
crisp optimization problems algorithms are available, this is not true for fuzzy optimization problems (Buckley 
and Jowers, 2008). Thus, we apply a Monte Carlo simulation for the computational evaluation in the follow-up. 
Problem Description 
The model is designed to schedule and assign various rescue units to incidents. It favors commanders with 
decision autonomy by delivering allocation solutions and schedules for all rescue units employed. The evolving 
question is how these units can be scheduled and assigned to incidents such that the sum of all completion times, 
which are individually multiplied by the individual factors of destruction, can be minimized. Factors of 
destruction indicate the (ordinal) levels of severity of incidents. 
 
Figure 1. Desideratum: optimal schedules and assignments 
We consider a situation in which the number of available rescue units is lower than the number of incidents that 
need to be processed. This ratio accounts for a typical natural disaster situation: “During any large-scale 
disaster, there tend to be more incidents than rescue units. This is especially true within those critical minutes of 
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the chaos phase.” (cit. THW, translated) An incident can be processed by a rescue unit only if this rescue unit 
features the specific capability that is required to process this incident. Two types of time spans are relevant: a) 
travel times that rescue units need to travel between two incident locations, b) processing times. We illustrate 
the problem description in Figure 1, which shows a feasible and valid solution of a problem instance with 5 
rescue units and 12 incidents. In this instance, the level of severity (factor of destruction wj) of incidents varies 
between 1 and 5. The sample schedule accounts for the specific requirements of the incidents as each rescue unit 
k features the respective capability that is required by incident j (capkj=1).  
Mathematical Model 
We define completion times as the sum of the processing times and the time the incident had to "wait" until 
being processed by a qualified rescue unit. This “waiting time” consists not only of processing times of 
incidents that have been processed previously by the assigned unit but also of the time needed to move from one  
incident to be processed to the next. In the assumed setting, we propose that a) the multiplication of completion 
times and factors of destruction 245 is an adequate proxy for the quality of emergency response, b) each incident 
can be processed by at most one unit at a time with each unit processing at most one incident at a time, c) 
processing is non-preemptive, and d) some data (processing times 678, severity of incidents 245, and travel times 3748) is available, deterministic, but highly uncertain and therefore not crisp. A discussion of these assumptions is 
included in our conclusions. Summarizing the restrictions and requirements from above, this decision model can 
be formulated as a non-linear binary optimization model. The mathematical formulation is provided below: 
min<245=<<>678	?@A8  B648  3748C	D@A8  ?@A8 =<DE@83E78FEG HI
J
8G
F
@G H
F
AG  (O) 
 
s.t. 
<<D@A8J8G  1
F
@G
	 , K = 1, . . , M (C1) 
<<D@A8
J
8G
= 1
FN
AG
	 , $ = 1, . . , M (C2) 
<DA8 = 1		,																O = 1, . . , P
FN
AG
 (C3) 
<D@(FN)8 = 1		,																O = 1, . . , P
F
@G
 (C4) 
?@E8 + ?EA8 − 1 ≤ ?@A8		, $ = 0, . . , M	; 	K = 1, . . , M + 1; O
= 1, . . ,P; R = 1, . . , M (C5) 
<D@E8
F
@G
=<DEA8
FN
AG
	 , R = 1, . . , M	; O = 1,… ,P (C6) 
D@A8 ≤ ?@A8		, $ = 0, . . , M; K = 1, . . , M + 1; O = 1, . . ,P (C7) 
?@@8 = 0,							$ = 0, . . . , M + 1; O = 1, . . , P (C8) 
<D@A8 ≤	,'68A 	,																$ = 1, . . , M; 	O = 1, . . ,P
FN
AG
 (C9) 
D@A8 , ?@A8 	 ∈ 0,1	, $ = 0, . . , M; K = 1, . . , M + 1; O
= 1, . . ,P (C10) 
,'68A ∈ 0, 1, O = 1, . . , P; 	K = 	1, . . , M (C11) 
245,648, 3748	∈ 	T  (C12) 
In addition to the real incidents 1,..,n we need to add two fictitious incidents ‘0’ and ‘n+1’ with 68 = 6FN8U = 0, 
and 348  to be the estimated time that rescue unit k needs to move from its starting location (defined as incident 
i=0) to the location of incident j, and 34(FN)8U = 0 for all rescue units k. The objective function (O) of the model 
minimizes the total weighted completion times over all incidents. Two decision variables D@A8  and ?@A8 are 
introduced indicating a mediate or immediate predecessor relationship between i and j when processed by rescue 
unit k. 245 is the reported factor of destruction of incident j and is modeled as a triangular fuzzy number. 
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Consequently, the lower the factor of destruction, the less severe is the incident. An explanation of the other 
mathematical terms used is provided in Table 1. 
Decision Variable Interpretation 
D@A8  D@A8 = 1 if incident i is processed immediately 
before incident j by rescue unit k, and 0 otherwise 
?@A8 ?@A8 = 1 if incident i is processed before incident j 
by rescue unit k, 0 otherwise 
Fuzzy Parameters Interpretation 
678 Processing time that unit k needs to process 
incident i,  678 = ∞ if rescue unit k is not capable 
of processing incident i 
3748 Travel time that unit k needs to move from location 
of incident i to location of  incident j 
245 Reported factor of destruction of incident j 
equivalent to the severity level of an incident 
Crisp Parameter Interpretation 
,'68A  ,'68A = 1 if rescue unit k is capable of addressing 
incident i, and 0 otherwise 
Table 1. Explanation of mathematical terms 
Constraint (C1) ensures that for each real incident there is exactly one incident that is processed immediately 
before. Similarly, (C2) ensures that for each real incident there is exactly one incident that is processed 
immediately thereafter. Constraints (C3)-(C4) guarantee that in a feasible solution each rescue agent starts 
processing the fictitious incident 0 and ends processing the fictitious incident n+1, respectively. (C5) accounts 
for the transitivity criterion of any predecessor relationship. Yet, if an immediate predecessor for a specific 
incident ‘l’ exists, there also has to be a successor (C6). (C7) indicates that an immediate predecessor is a 
general predecessor. (C8) prohibits a reflexive, direct or indirect predecessor relationship. (C9) ensures that a 
rescue unit that is assigned to an incident possesses the required, incident-specific capability. (C10) makes the 
model a binary program. (C11) declares if a rescue unit is capable of operating an incident or not. (C12) defines 
all other parameters used. Each feasible solution of the minimization model represents a valid schedule and 
assignment for all units. 
This Fuzzy Decision Model is especially able to manage informational overload and linguistic uncertainty by 
integrating fuzzy parameters (Requirement 4): impreciseness in reports from on-site forces is prevalent when 
determining travel and processing times, as well as severity of incidents. Furthermore, the model is also apt to 
assist (decentralized) commanders with decision autonomy but does not require exact (crisp) but complete 
information about all parameters (Requirement 2). In the adjacent sections, it will be shown that the model is 
adequate to deliver timely results within decent runtimes when applying the solution heuristic (Requirement 1). 
The idea to search for something optimal during any disaster is questionable and can be doubted, especially 
when integrating uncertain information (fuzzy parameters) into the model. We therefore talk about the quest for 
the most effective allocations of rescue units in an uncertain setting. Disaster situations are evolving very fast 
sometimes (based on incoming information about the situation, incoming new resources, or on status changes of 
existing resources). Even though the presented approach seems to not account for this inherent dynamic and to 
be static, we explicitly suggest running the optimization of weighted completion times anew once other incidents 
appear or rescue units become idle (continuous optimization process). This way, alternatives and decisions can 
also be revisited and alterations be integrated. 
COMPUTATIONAL EVALUATION 
The Fuzzy Decision Model is a generalization of the machine scheduling problem “Identical parallel machine 
non-preemptive scheduling with minimization of sum of completion times” (Blazewicz, Dror, and Weglarz, 
1991). Since any solution of the machine scheduling problem is computationally inefficient and thus NP-hard, 
so is its transformation to the Fuzzy Decision Model (see Appendix). As we face instances in practice, that need 
to be tackled as fast as possible, we suggest a Monte Carlo simulation as heuristic method. In the absence of 
knowledge of optimal solutions, we do not know lower bounds for the minimization instances, but we know 
solutions that would result from applying a greedy heuristic. Recapitulating the greedy approach, we assume 
that the most severe incident is assigned to the closest, idle rescue unit. The evaluation of all Monte Carlo results 
is based on the comparison with this benchmark indicating the proportionate reduction of harm. 
Implementations were written in the numerical computing environment MATLAB. 
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Data Generation and Origin 
Information for conducting our simulation runs and for configuring data settings was integrated into scenarios in 
accordance to the THW interviews. We consider short travels as for most incidents occur in overcrowded areas, 
such as cities, where rescue units are placed relatively close to incidents. We also assume that processing times 
exceed travels, due to the hypothesis that urban areas are endangered more often than rural areas which result in 
lower ratios of travel to processing times. The factors of destruction indicate levels of severity and express five 
different stages for each incident, we refer to the advisory system concerning threat conditions and risks 
introduced by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security: low (1), guarded (2), elevated (3), high (4), and 
severe (5) harm. We tackle informational uncertainty by assigning vague linguistic assessments of any incidents 
to one of the ordinal factors of destruction expressed as fuzzy numbers. This assignment takes place when 
linguistic reports about incidents, casualties, and damage need to be processed and incidents need to be 
prioritized. For example, reports about incidents indicating “little damage” or “minor wounds” are assigned a 
fuzzy number close to 1 (low). Whereas reports about “injured, trapped, or exposed people” will be classified by 
a much higher fuzzy number, i.e. 5 (severe). Please note that any assignment of terms to a fuzzy number is never 
distinct (and thus fuzzy) and is always depending on the specific situation of the disaster. We consider this 
prioritization of incidents to be crucial. 
The number of capabilities of rescue units is set to five, due to the difficulty to clearly classify all skilled units 
during any disaster (i.e. paramedics, fire brigades, police enforcement, military forces, or volunteers with 
various other skills). We extend the classification of rescue units stated by (New South Wales Government). 
Any rescue unit possesses one distinct capability each. The fulfillment of Requirement 3 can be guaranteed by 
this random assignment of rescue units’ capabilities mapping real world scenarios with heterogeneous incidents 
that require specialized forces. 
In all simulation runs executed, we explicitly suppose an ad-hoc, iterative operation mode and thus a continuous 
optimization, as noted in the above section. Since we motivated our decision model to work for (decentralized) 
commanders with decision autonomy within their own operational area (Requirement 2), we assume the number 
of incidents (within this area) to not exceed 200 at a time. We assume the number of rescue units, which are 
available and idle at the time of optimization, to not exceed 20. Since we advise to keep planning intervals short, 
we may execute an iterative Monte Carlo simulation. An iterative Monte Carlo simulation (continuous 
optimization respectively) is equivalent to the repeated dispatch of assignments and schedules for rescue units. 
Therefore, our approach is apt to react fast and timely (Requirement 1) to any upcoming situational change 
during the disaster. For our computational evaluation we regard seven different scenarios that result from 
permuting numbers of incidents and/or units. 
Parameter Value, Range, Distribution Rationale 
Rescue units {10,20} Realistic numbers of rescue units and 
incidents within operational areas Incidents {20,50,100, 200} 
Processing 
times 6875  
Normally distributed: µ=20, σ=10 Occurrence of disasters close to 
overcrowded areas (thus: low travel times 
between incidents); WLOG: significant 
endurance of (mean) processing times to 
(mean) travel times (factor: 20:1) 
Travel times 3875  Normally distributed: µ=1, σ=0.3 
Factors of 
destruction 275 
Random Integer: {1,..,5} Distinct risk levels introduced by the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security 
Capabilities 
W, . . , WF 
n=5 
A1: Search and Rescue 
A2: Paramedics / Medical Retrieval 
A3: Fire Brigades 
A4: Police Units 
A5: Special Casualty Access Team 
Distinction of units’ types and skills 
extending the classification of (New South 
Wales Government) 
Iterations 1000 No significant improvements in the 
objective value beyond this point 
Table 2. Settings in randomly generated scenarios 
Results 
We benchmarked all Monte Carlo simulation results to the results generated by a greedy policy (however, we 
did not determine optimal solution values or lower bounds): the most severe incident is assigned the closest, idle 
rescue unit and the remaining idle rescue units are allocated to incidents in the same manner. We present 
proportions of Monte Carlo simulation results to those of the Greedy Policy by means of box plots. Any value 
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represents the ratio of objective values (total weighted completion times) between the Monte Carlo simulation 
and the greedy heuristic. The box plots comprise the means (red dash), the quartiles (ends of box), the 
lowest/highest datum within 1.5 IQR (whiskers), and all outliers (stars). Thus, if both the Monte Carlo 
simulation and the benchmark deliver the same assignment and schedule, and thus the same objective value, the 
ratio would be presented as ‘1.0’. If Monte Carlo performs better than the benchmark, thus the total weighted 
completion times are lower, the ratios also tend to be lower. 7 different scenarios (10 instances each) have been 
generated randomly according to the preconditions in Table 2. All Monte Carlo simulations have been aborted 
after 1,000 iterations to allow for acceptable runtimes in practice. No significant improvements in the results 
have been identified thereafter. The number of iterations does affect the running time and the resulting quality of 
the Monte Carlo simulation. Yet, 1,000 iterations of the Monte Carlo simulation were run within 17 minutes for 
the worst-case scenario (20,200). Results were obtained in 2 minutes for the (10,20) scenario (best-case). 
Results of the Greedy heuristic have been generated between several seconds (best-case) and 2 minutes (worst-
case). 
 
Figure 2. Results indicating the ratio between the heuristics used. 
As Figure 2 indicates, the Monte Carlo simulation performs better than the Greedy Policy. Ranges of deviation 
of simulation results were acceptable for all problem scenarios and all results did not exceed the benchmark 
(proportions ≤1.0). In scenario (10,20), the Monte Carlo simulation was even able to generate a total weighted 
completion time of less than a quarter of which would have been caused by the greedy heuristic. Monte Carlo 
delivered damage reductions of at least 10%-20% on average compared to the benchmark. Apparently, the ratios 
are closer to 100% the more complex the scenarios get (starting from 20 rescue units). This phenomenon is not 
surprising as the fraction of the solution space that gets evaluated by the Monte Carlo simulation declines with 
increasing instance size. A countermeasure would be to increase the number of iterations in the Monte Carlo 
simulation, which in turn would require having available more computing power than we had (in order to 
sustain the efficiency and thus the applicability of the Monte Carlo simulation in practice). Based on the results 
at hand, we observe a high coefficient of variation for some scenarios that we explain as a consequence of 
“fuzzifying” the parameters, which may reflect the cost of incorporating linguistic vagueness. 
All results were subjected to the Shapiro-Wilk test (Shapiro and Wilk, 1965) to prove normality. Pre-proven 
normality holds as necessary condition for further analysis: results of significance tests expressed that the 
simulations of all our models do outperform the benchmark within the confidence intervals of a 95% 
significance level except for instance (10,100) where a normal distribution of the results was rejected. Our 
results attest that solving our models with Monte Carlo outperforms the heuristic which is applied in practice. 
CONCLUSION 
The management of natural disasters poses immense challenges ranging from informational uncertainty to the 
coordination problem of distributed, heterogeneous rescue units, since disasters continue to hit our societies. 
Although NDM has evolved to a research discipline where IS artifacts have already been proposed, decision 
support procedures for assignments and schedules of rescue units have mostly been neglected in research.  
Addressing this lack in research, the paper proposes a quantitative decision support model for the optimal 
allocation of distributed, heterogeneous rescue units based on fuzzy set theory to deal with non-statistical 
informational uncertainty. Requirements identified in the literature and in interviews are accounted for. Our 
Monte Carlo-based solution heuristic offers decision support timely to any commander. While the proposed 
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decision model may be particularly useful in the presence of complex situations with large numbers of rescue 
units and incidents, any assignments and schedules of rescue units determined through computation are not 
intended to replace the actual decision making process nor the autonomy of commanders but may serve as 
valuable decision support only. When seen in the context of solving a sequence of  model instances over time, 
our decision support approach also accounts for the dynamics and unpredictability in disaster management 
situations, which are rooted in the occurrence of new or newly assessed incidents and a changing availability of 
rescue units. Thereby, our approach can be embedded in a time-continuous optimization process. 
Due to the computational hardness of our decision model, we draw on Monte Carlo simulation and 
computationally demonstrated its benefits. The results show that there is large potential to improve a greedy 
heuristic to allocate and schedule rescue units. To conclude, we are aware that our research still has some 
limitations and invites for future work: (1) We exclude the possibility that rescue units may fatigue and thus 
refrain from a reduction in performance of rescue units over time. (2) Our model does not account for time 
windows of incidents. Such windows are appropriate when casualties have a finite “time to live” to be rescued. 
(3) The model does not consider pre-emptive approaches. (4) As real-life data-sets merely exist, all scenarios 
had to be randomly generated. Thus, empirical research is necessary to gather more realistic data. 
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APPENDIX 
Proof of NP-hardness 
The Fuzzy Decision Model (M1) is a generalization of the machine scheduling problem “Identical parallel 
machine non-preemptive scheduling with minimization of sum of completion times” (M2), which is NP-hard 
(Blazewicz et al., 1991): if we map incidents on jobs and rescue units on machines, then the generalization 
refers to the fact that our problem provides for setup times (travel times), non-identical machines, and 
constraints on the assignment of rescue units to incidents. Given an instance of M2, we can map this instance 
onto an instance of M1 (in polynomial time) by ignoring each parameter that belongs to a fuzzy set, by setting 
3748 = 0 for all jobs i,j and for all machines k, by setting 678X = 678Y  for all jobs i and all machines k1 and k2, and 
by setting ,'68E = 1 for all rescue units k and for all incidents i. Thus, our problem is NP-hard, too. Integrating 
Fuzzy Set Theory in this proof even raises the complexity. 
